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According to the classification in official statistics, Dutch pension plans have 
mainly preserved their DB character in recent years. The dominant reaction of pension 
funds to the fall in funding ratios at the beginning of this century has been a switch from 
final-pay schemes to average-wage schemes. This contrasts sharply with the experience 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, where the fall in pension funding ratios has 
accelerated the switch from DB to DC schemes.  
  
This paper scrutinizes the recent evolution of Dutch pension plans: how does the 
evolution of Dutch pension funds diverge from that of Anglo-Saxon pension funds, and 
how can we explain this divergence? Using an ALM framework, we argue that the 
current average-wage pension plans may be better viewed as hybrid DB-DC schemes, as 
indexation of all liabilities has been made solvency-contingent. Because these hybrid 
plans make use of two steering mechanisms to control solvency risk, Dutch pension funds 
display a high effectiveness in minimizing the risk of under-funding.  
 
The current hybrid schemes reflect a compromise between the various 
stakeholders. We examine the institutional basis for this compromise, and contrast this 
with the situation in Anglo-Saxon pension funds, where primarily employers are 
responsible for absorbing funding deficits, which gives them in turn more grip on pension 
plan design issues. In addition, we look at the role of unions, the strong preferences 
within the Dutch society for collective risk-sharing, and the underlying high level of 
social trust, as explanations for the divergence with the experience in the US and the UK. 
 
For the longer term, we foresee that Dutch pension plans will shift further towards 
stand-alone multimember plans, often being called collective DC. This will be 
accompanied by more differentiation in risk exposure between younger and older 
members.  
 
Collective risk-sharing will thus remain an important element in Dutch pension 
funds. In this sense, the evolution of Dutch pension schemes diverges from the 
developments of Anglo-Saxon pension funds, where risks are shifted more to the 
individual. Finally, we argue that collective risk-sharing has some important advantages 
over individual risk-sharing.  
 
 
 1.  Introduction 
 
As in most developed countries, the institutional structure of the pension system in the 
Netherlands is organized as a three-pillar system. The first comprises the public pension scheme, 
offering a basic flat-rate pension to all retirees. Financing is on a pay-as-you-go basis. The benefit 
level keeps pace with the legal minimum wage. The second pillar provides former workers an 
additional income from the supplementary scheme. The third comprises personal savings, which 
individuals undertake at their own expense. 
 
The supplementary pension system in the Netherlands is organized mainly as a funded defined-
benefit plan. The benefit entitlement is determined by years of service and a reference wage, 
which can be final pay or the average wage over the years of service. The defined-benefit formula 
takes into account the retirement benefit of the public scheme. In the postwar period, the plans 
primarily were structured as final-pay plans. Many pension funds aimed at a gross benefit— 
including the public pension — of 70% of the gross wage income last earned. This maximum will 
usually be reached after 40 years of service, as the typical accrual rate is 1.75%. As we explain in 
this paper, many pension funds have switched from final-pay plans to average-wage plans.  
 
In an average-wage plan, individuals accrue pension rights yearly based on a percentage of the 
salary earned in each year of their working life (rather than the final year, as in a final-pay plan), 
usually re-valued upwards each year to take account of inflation or wage growth. The accrual rate 
is 2% or even higher, as for many individuals a total pension equal to 80% of average wage 
corresponds with 70% final pay. After retirement, benefits are mostly inflation-indexed or wage-
indexed. The indexation, however, is conditional on the financial position of the pension fund. 
 
The law stipulates that pension promises made to employees must be funded. Furthermore, the 
assets for the defined benefits have to be held within a separate trust, usually organized as a 
pension fund. Three types of pension funds can be distinguished. The first type is the industry 
pension fund, which is organized for a specific branch of industry (construction, healthcare).  The 
law stipulates that participation in an industry pension fund is mandatory for all firms operative in 
the branch. A company can opt out only if it establishes a company pension fund that offers a 
better pension plan to its employees than the pension plan of the industry fund. This is the second 
type of pension fund. When a supplementary scheme exists, either as a company pension fund or 
as an industry pension fund, participation by the workers is generally mandatory. This is 
governed by collective labor agreements. The third type pension fund is an occupational pension 
fund, which is organized for a specific group of professionals, like the medicine profession. 
 
The Dutch pension-fund system is sizeable, and covers more than 90% of the labor force. As 
reported by table 1, the value of assets under management at the end of 2005 was 637 billion 
euros, which is 125% of national income. More than 85 percent of all pension funds are company 
pension funds. The remaining 15 percent are predominantly industry pension funds, and there are 
a small number of occupational pension funds (e.g. medical doctors).    2
The industry pension funds are the really big players in terms of the relative share in total active 
members and assets under management. There are 80 industry-wide pension funds, covering two-
thirds of all assets and almost 85 percent of all plan participants. Standing out among these are 
the civil servant pension fund APB (191 bln euros end of 2005) and PGGM, the pension fund for 
employees in the health sector (71 bln euros end of 2005). These two funds belong to the biggest 
pension funds in the world, and together they cover almost 30% of all active members and 40% 
of total assets under management. Approximately 700 company pension funds encompass 30% of 
the remaining assets and 15% of the plan participants. Occupational pension funds are mostly 
very small funds.  
 
Table 1. Pension funds in the Netherlands (end of 2005) 




  in %  in %  in % 
Company pension funds  86 30.5 14.5 
      
Industry-wide  12.5 66.7  84.8 
   ABP (public servants and education)    29.8  18.5 
   PGGM (health)    11.1  16.9 
      
Occupational pension funds  1.5 2.8  0.7 
Total    100% 100%  100% 
      
Total (absolute numbers)  822 637  bln  €  623,3000 
Source: Dutch Central Bank (DNB)       
 
At the beginning of this century, pension funds in the Netherlands, the US and the UK were hit 
by a perfect storm on equity markets (see Boeri et al. 2006: 13-14). As a result, the funding ratios 
fell sharply in these countries. In this paper we compare the way Dutch pension funds reacted to 
these events with the experiences in the UK and the US. How did the Dutch reaction diverge 
from the reaction in the two Anglo-Saxon countries, and what explains this divergence? We focus 
on the change in pension plans as a reaction to the funding crisis. At first sight, although more 
participants of Dutch pension schemes now have a DC-type plan (table 2), over 90 percent of 
active participants still have some form of DB plan, and the Dutch pension system seems 
therefore to have preserved its DB character.    3
Table 2. Ordering of pension funds according to type of pension plan  
(percentage of active participants, 1998-2005)   
  DC plans DB plans   
  Total Total Final  pay  Average  wage Combination  Fixed  amount   
1998  0.8  99.2  66.5 25.0  6.0  1.7   
1999  1.4  98.6  59.6 31.2  6.2  1.6   
2000  3.1  96.9  58.7 30.6  6.2  1.4   
2001  3.9  96.1  56.1 32.2  6.5  1.3   
2002  6.1  93.9  54.3 31.6  6.8  1.1   
2003  5.8  94.2  49.3 35.4  8.6  0.9   
2004  5.7  94.3  12.0 72.6  8.6  1.0   
2005  6.1  93.9  10.6 74.3  8.1  0.9   
             
Δ 1998-
2005 
+5.3  -5.3  -55.9 +49.7  +2.1  -0.8   
Source: DNB 
 
As table 2 clarifies, the predominant switch after 2001 was not from DB to DC, but from DB-
final salary to DB-average salary. This contrasts sharply with the experience in the US and the 
UK, where the perfect storm accelerated the switch from DB to DC (Munnell 2006). In 2004, 
DC-plan assets amounted to 22 percent of total occupational plan assets in the UK and to 35 
percent in the US. The corresponding figure in the Netherlands is 9 percent (OECD 2006).      
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background information about the 
immediate causes for the recent evolution of Dutch pension funds: the fall in funding ratios, the 
switch to fair-value accounting and the imposition of the new regulatory framework by the 
supervisor (De Nederlandsche Bank). Section 3 takes a closer look at the nature of the switch 
within the Dutch pension funds; we try to ascertain to what extent pension funds have maintained 
their DB-character and in what ways they deviate, in this respect, from developments in the UK 
and the US. The aim of the fourth section is to explain why Dutch pension funds did not switch 
into outright DC schemes. Section 5, which speculates on how robust recent changes in Dutch 
pension funds are, also puts into perspective recent and future changes in the Dutch occupational 
pension system. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Background: The fall in funding ratios and the need to act 
 
2.1  The fall in funding ratios 
 
Pension funds in the Netherlands experienced a serious fall in funding ratios after the millennium 
turn (table 3). The funding ratio is defined as assets under management over the value of pension-
fund liabilities. The fall in funding ratios was due, in particular, to two developments in financial 
markets. The first was the collapse of stock markets, and therefore the decline of the value of 
assets held by pension funds; the second involves the fall in interest rates, which approached 
historic low levels and which led to a sharp increase in the fair value of pension-fund liabilities.    4
 
Table 3.  Average funding ratio Dutch pension funds (2000-2005) 
Average funding ratio (nominal)  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
All  funds  132  118 101 104 119 125 
Company  funds  135  123 110 117 123 130 
Industry-wide  funds  131 116 97  99 118  123 
Source: DNB  
 
2.2  Fair-value accounting  
 
Also in the years after the millennium turn, fair-value principles entered pension-fund 
accounting, following the worldwide introduction of new international accounting rules. The fall 
in funding ratios could no longer be masked, since pension funds are now required to report 
assets and liabilities on a fair-value base (see Boeri et al. 2006: 66-67). 
 
The fair-value accounting principles replaced the traditional actuarial approach, which typically 
was grounded on rules-of-thumb regarding valuation and accounting issues. The main goal of this 
approach was to arrive at stability in the contribution rate and the funding ratio over time. This 
came at the price of suppressing the risk exposure in the funding process. Actually, the actuarial 
approach implied a self-constructed representation of the solvency position of a pension fund 
without any link to financial markets. The fair-value approach relies on methods of financial 
theory and techniques prevailing in financial markets. The main goal is to make an objective 
analysis of the solvency position of the pension fund and of the implied risks in meeting the 
promised benefits.  
 
The fair-valuation principles inevitably lead to high volatility in the value of pension-fund assets 
and liabilities. Thus, liabilities have become more volatile, since the actuarially fixed discount 
rate was replaced by the actual yield curve of interest rates prevailing in the market.  The 
transition to fair-value methods has forced pension funds to redefine their risk management 
(Kortleve et al. 2006). Since the explicit measurement of risk exposure reveals the high volatility 
in the solvency position, the reported probability of under-funding increases considerably, 
compared to the actuarial approach. One way or another, fair-value accounting will lead to higher 
funding costs of pensions. Pension funds have to choose either less risk taking or a higher 
solvency reserve position. As we will see further, adjusting the pension promise has become a 
fruitful way out.  
 
2.3  Policy choices and requirements imposed by the supervisor  
 
Supervision of pension funds in the post-war period was quite loose. The solvency requirements 
never affected pension funds— not even during the seventies, when pension funds actually were 
in a situation of severe underfunding. Actually, there were no explicitly documented 
requirements at all. The perception by pension funds was that the funding ratio based on the fixed 
4% discount rate for liabilities had to be at least 100%.   5
 
The period of supervisory tolerance came to an abrupt end in September 2002. Faced by the 
solvency crisis, the supervisor imposed strict requirements on pension funds in order to restore 
the fall in funding ratios in a short period of time and to raise contribution levels to reflect the 
true costs of pensions (details in Box 1, below). Meeting these requirements would necessitate 
either a steep increase in contributions or severe cuts in benefits — or a combination of the two. 
A storm of critique arose. High contributions would harm the macro-economy (van Vuren 2003). 
Furthermore, high contribution rates would undermine support for the defined-benefit plans and 
might force an undesirable shift to individual defined-contribution plans. The debate resulted in a 
relaxation of the requirements. Also consensus grew to renew pension-fund supervision. As of 
January 2007, the Financial Assessment Framework is in operation, which defines solvency 
requirements in a stochastic fair-value framework (see Box 1). The new requirements have 
compelled pension funds to improve their risk management tools in order to have better control 
over their short-term solvency position and to ensure that the promised benefits can be met in the 
long run with adequate certainty, given the funding policy (contributions and asset mix).  
 
 
Box 1: The 2002 circulation letter of the pension supervisor 
 
On September 30, 2002, the supervisor at that time (the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority 
(PVK), currently part of De Nederlandsche Bank) circulated a letter to all pension funds, clarifying the 
current financial supervisory framework and outlining the adjustments needed to restore pension-fund 
solvency and establish more prudent financial management in the short- and medium run (see OECD 
2004: 58). The letter contained three main elements: 
-  Pension funds with a funding ratio below 105 percent had to restore this within one year. In 2002, 10 
percent of pension funds had a funding ratio below 100 percent, among them a number of large 
pension funds. More than 30 percent of pension funds had a funding ratio between 100 and 110 
percent. The new pension law that came into force as of January 2007 extended the one-year recovery 
period to three years. 
-  Pension funds with a funding ratio below 130 percent were asked to present a plan that should indicate 
by which means they intend to raise their funding ratio at least to 130 percent within a maximal period 
of eight years. This concerned more than 70 percent of all pension funds. In the new Principles on the 
Regulation of Financial Regulation of Pension Funds, which were approved by Parliament in March 
2004, the time horizon of eight years was extended to 15 years.  
-  Pension funds had to raise contribution rates to levels that would, at the least, cover costs. The 
subsequent discussion focused primarily how to valuate soft liabilities (for example, through 
solvency-contingent indexation).   
   6
2.4  Pension funds react: Raising contribution rates and changing pension plans 
 
This section briefly describes the way in which pension funds reacted to the funding crisis and 
the requirements imposed by the regulator to restore solvability. The focus is on the development 
of pension contributions, the change in pensions plans and the change in indexation. At the 
beginning of this century, approximately 950 pension funds were operating in the Netherlands, 
and not all have reacted in a similar way. Since the main focus here is on the general evolution of 
Dutch pension funds, we review the dominant trends regarding company pension funds and 
industry-wide pension funds. For a more detailed analysis on the differential responses by Dutch 
funds, see Kakes (2006). As shown in table 3, sector-wide pension funds were hit harder by the 
perfect storm than company funds were. A possible explanation for this is that larger funds 
invested more in (foreign) equity and that larger funds are predominantly industry pension funds. 
At least one-third of the shift in the 1990s in the investment portfolio of pension funds towards 
foreign equity (see table 1) can be explained by the change in investment strategy of the biggest 
pension fund, APB (Van Riel, Hemerijck and Visser 2003; pp. 70-71). 
 
Development of contributions 
Table 4 shows that contributions more than doubled between 2000 and 2005 — almost 13% of 
wages. In relation to gross wages, contributions were raised by around 100% during this period. 
The relative increase in contributions of company funds and industry funds was similar. 
Company funds, however, increased contributions much faster. An industry pension fund needs 
more time to reformulate funding policy, as representatives of employers and employees both 
have to agree (see DNB 2005; Kakes 2006).   
 
Table 4. Contributions paid to Dutch pension funds (millions of euros) 
  2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 ∆% 
2001-5 
a. Contributions (bln)  12.8  18.5  20.9  22.9  25.2  96 
b.  Gross  wage  sum  (bln)  182.6  189.5 193.8 194.6 196.6  8 
c. Contribution rate (a/b)  7.0%  9.8%  10.8%  11.8%  12.8%  83 
d. Contributions company 
funds (bln) 
3.6 7.5  7.0  6.8  7.3  103 
e. Contributions industry funds 
(bln) 
9.0 10.8  13.6  15.8  17.6  95 
Source: DNB (rows a,d,e); Statistics Netherlands (row b) 
 
Change in pension plans 
The developments of pension plans for all pension funds appear in table 2. Table 5 compares the 
shift in pension plans between company — and industry funds.    7
Table 5. Relative shares of DB and DC plans in total active membership in Dutch pension plans 
 DC  DB 
Company   Total  Final  wage  Average  wage  Combination 
1998 2.4  97.6  56.5 19.1  21.6 
2005 8.5  91.5  19.5 38.5  33.2 
Δ 1998-2005  +6.1  -6.1 -37.0  +19.5  +11.6 
Industry*          
1998 0.3  99.7  70.5 27.9  0.0 
2005 2.7  97.3  9.2 84.6  3.2 
Δ 1998-2005  +2.4  -2.4 -61.3  +56.7  +3.2 
Source: DNB; * Mandatory industry funds 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this comparison: 
1.  The switch away from final-salary schemes has been more pronounced in industry funds. 
In 1998, 70 percent of active participants had a final salary pension plan. In 2005, this 
number had fallen to 9 percent. The corresponding figures for company funds are 56 
percent and 19 percent. Particularly decisive regarding the developments in industry funds 
was the switch of both of the largest pension funds, ABP and PGGM, to average salary 
schemes in 2004.  
2.  Industry funds have almost exclusively switched from final-wage plans to average-wage 
plans. The switch to combination plans or DC plans has been small. In contrast, company 
funds have switched more to combination plans and DC plans. Combination plans are 
grouped in this table as DB plans. However, a typical combination plan in company funds 
combines a DB-type plan up to a certain ceiling, and a DC-type plan for the remainder of 




After the perfect storm, pension funds tried to recover from their low funding ratios. The 
recovery came partly from indexation cuts. One may speak of an indexation cut when a given 
level of indexation is less than full indexation — the latter usually tied to price inflation or wage 
growth. Table 6 shows, that in the years 2004 and 2005 the given indexation level lagged behind 
price inflation. 
 
Table 6. Indexation in a sample of Dutch pension plans (2004-2005) 
 Price 
Inflation 
Indexation benefits and accrued 
liabilities* 
   Company  Industry 
2004  2.0 1.6 1.6 
2005  1.2 0.9 0.2 
Source: DNB  
*The sample consists of the 24 largest pension funds in the Netherlands; approximately half of these have limited 
indexation below inflation. The data shown in the table report the weighted-average indexation.    8
3.  Pension-plan redesign by Dutch pension funds and risk reallocation 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
As a result of the switch from final-pay to average-wage-type entitlements, almost three-quarters 
of participants in Dutch pension funds now have an average-wage entitlement. Official statistics 
classify these funds as DB schemes. However, a typical characteristic of the Dutch average-salary 
schemes is that indexation of all accrued liabilities is made dependent on the solvency position of 
the pension fund through a so-called policy ladder. A policy ladder enlarges the funds’ risk-
bearing capacity, and is part of the pension deal agreed upon by the social partners within the 
board of trustees. A typical policy ladder relates the contribution policy and indexation policies 
explicitly one-to-one to the financial position of the pension fund. This section evaluates some 
examples of policy ladders and elaborates on the consequences of the redesign of pension plans,  
questioning whether current average-wage plans can still be characterized as genuine DB 
schemes. 
 
3.2  The hybrid character of current Dutch pension funds 
 
Diagram 1 shows the functioning of a policy ladder for a typical pension plan currently in the 
Netherlands. In this diagram, the x-axis denotes the value of the assets A of the pension fund 
under study. A pension fund is said to be fully funded when assets A equal the value of the real 
liabilities LR, the latter being the value of accrued rights when full indexation always would be 
given. LR is calculated by discounting the accrued rights with the real yield curve net of real wage 
growth (compare also Box 2). The value of the nominal liabilities, LN, is the value of accrued 
rights when no indexation would be given. The size of LN is determined by discounting the 
accrued liabilities with the nominal yield curve. The difference between real and nominal 
liabilities,  LR - LN, is the required indexation reserve that is needed to cover the indexation 
promise to the participants. The actual indexation reserve position is A - LN , which may be either 
positive or negative. Along the vertical axis, the contribution rate and the indexation rate are set. 
 
Box 2 Valuation of accrued pension rights 
Plan members accrue pension rights during their years of service. The aggregate accrued pension rights in 
the pension fund will give rise to a yearly stream of benefits from now to some 80 years in the future. The 
present value of this stream of foreseeable benefits B1, B2, …. , B80 is the value of the liabilities of the 
pension fund, where B1 is the benefit cash flow in period 1, B2 in period t=2 and so on.  
The pension plan in operation usually specifies some rules regarding indexation. Indexation rules stipulate 
in what way the stream of foreseeable benefits has to be increased with the inflation or wage growth from 
year to year. A plan may define that there is no indexation at all. The benefits are fixed in nominal terms, 
and can be increased only by an additional year of service. Expression [1] shows how the nominal value of 
liabilities LN can be determined by discounting future benefits with the nominal rate of interest, where rN 
reflects the (constant) nominal rate of interest: 
   9






























80 2  
 
A pension plan may also have prescribed that accrued rights are adjusted yearly for price inflation or wage 
growth. The real value of liabilities LR is then the present value of the stream of indexed benefits. 
Expression [2] reflects the value of price-indexed liabilities, where π
e reflects the (constant) expected 
indexation. Expression [2] can be rewritten as [2a] by splitting the nominal rate of interest into its two 
base components: the real rate of interest, rR, and the expected inflation rate, π






























































Expression [3] specifies the value of wage-indexed liabilities, where the term y reflects real wage growth. 
 






























80 2  
.  
 
The base contribution rate is fixed. There is room for full indexation equal to the wage growth 
when the value of assets is equal to or larger than the value of the real liabilities: A ≥ LR. Then, 
the actual indexation reserve A – LN  is at least equal to the required indexation reserve LR – LN . 
The indexation rate will be zero when the assets are equal to or even below the nominal 
liabilities: A≤ LN . The actual indexation reserve then is zero — or is even negative. Between 
these two points (i.e. when LN <A< LR), indexation follows the wage growth partly where the 
indexation given is determined by the proportion of the actual indexation reserve in relation to the 
required indexation reserve. When A > LR, catch-up indexation may be given up to a maximum 
equal to the previously missed indexation due to indexation cuts. The possibility of catch-up 
indexation is indicated by the dotted line.  

















The broadening of solvency-contingent indexation implies that the final pension result will be 
partly dependent on investment returns. The current typical average wage scheme can therefore 
better be described as a hybrid DB-DC plan, keeping a midway position between a traditional DB 
plan, with flexible contributions and well-defined indexed pensions, and a DC plan, with 
uncertainty as to the final pension result because of uncertainty on the rate of return on 
investments. The hybrid plan is partly DB by nature because the yearly accrual of pension rights 
is specified in the same way as a traditional DB plan, and because contributions are flexible, 
depending on the financial position of the pension fund. The hybrid plan is partly DC by nature, 
as the yearly indexation is related to the financial position of the fund and therefore is related to 
the investment returns.  
 
A number of pension funds have gone one step further than the hybrid plan by abolishing the use 
of the contribution rate as a risk-steering instrument. This type of plan can be characterized as a 
collective DC plan with fixed contributions but flexible benefits, depending on the financial 




3.3  A further examination of the hybrid character of Dutch pension funds 
 
In order to determine more specifically the hybrid character of Dutch pension funds and the 
consequences of the shift to hybrid schemes, we use an ALM framework to compare the 
allocation of risk among the plan members in a typical current pension plan to both a traditional 
DB plan and collective DC plan.   11
 
Box 3: Asset Liability Management (ALM) 
Pension funds use ALM analysis to evaluate the pension deal in operation and to explore the performance 
of alternative pension deals. A pension deal defines, essentially, what is being promised, how the promises 
are funded (asset mix and contribution policy) and who is bearing the risks in the funding process (risk-
allocation rules). ALM is broadly seen as a cornerstone for the fund policy, as it provides insight into the 
realism and the sustainability of the pension deal in operation at different horizons. Typically, an ALM 
study uses an economic model to produce stochastic simulations of returns on asset classes and other 
relevant economic data, such as inflation. A scenario analysis is subsequently performed that results in 
probability distributions for the key variables. Sensitivity analysis is usually carried out to explore specific 
policy variants in asset mix, contribution policy and indexation rules. Policy variants are evaluated in 
terms of expected values and relevant risk measures for key variables — the funding ratio, the 
contribution rate, the indexation rate, and so on. Moreover, one can easily take care of specific constraints, 
such as the funding requirements of the supervisor (e.g. a minimum probability of under-funding) and a 
maximum level of contribution rate. 
 
Diagram 2 is a stylized representation of risk allocation within a traditional DB plan structure 
wherein indexed benefits are guaranteed and funding risks are absorbed by flexible contributions. 
This can be seen as a stylized representation of risk bearing in the Netherlands in the postwar 
period up to 2000. As in diagram 1, the base contribution rate is fixed. Additional contributions 
are not necessary when assets match real liabilities: A = LR . A situation of real under-funding, A 
< L R, or real over-funding, A >  L R, leads to, respectively, a surcharge to, or a cut in, the 
contribution rate. A situation of under-funding or over-funding is smoothed out over a period of 
35 years. 
 
The setting of solvency-contingent indexation in the collective DC plan in diagram 3 is the same 
as in the hybrid DB-DC plan (diagram 1). However, the contribution rate in the collective DC 
plan is fixed. This plan also allows for catch-up indexation like the hybrid plan does, once again 
indicated by the dotted line. 


















We evaluate the performance of the three examples of policy ladders described in diagrams 1-3. 
Results are derived from Hoevenaars & Ponds (2006).  The pension fund under study is a stylized 
pension fund as a representative for industry-wide pension funds in the Netherlands. A classic 
ALM study is applied for a horizon of 20 years (2006-2025). For each of the three variants, the 
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key variables.  On average, the expected return on a 50-50 mix over the 5000 scenarios is 6.7%. 
The average growth rate of liabilities is 4.5%, consisting of the indexation component (equal to 
the average wage growth of 2%) and the discount-rate component (equal to 2.5%). On average, 
therefore, the excess return of assets over the liability growth rate is 2.2%.  
 
Table 7. ALM projections 
 Mean  Risk 
(standard deviation) 
Stocks 9.0  22.0 
Rate of interest  4.5  1.0 
Wage growth  2.0  1.0 
Inflation 2.0  1.0 
Discount rate real liabilities  2.5  1.0 
Excess return  2.2  9.5 
 
We set the initial real funding ratio at 85%
1, reflecting the current situation of underfunding  at 
many pension plans in the Netherlands.  
 
Table 8 summarizes the classic ALM results for the three variants of plan design. The text below 
the table explains the significance of the indicators. The reported evidence in this table provides 
insights regarding the question of how pension-plan design (i.e. the structuring of the policy 
ladder) determines the way in which the risks in the funding process are absorbed — by 
adjustments in contributions or by adjustments in indexation rate or in funding ratio. 
 
                                                 
1 For the stylized pension fund, this implies a nominal funding ratio of 120%. A nominal funding ratio of about 140% corresponds 
with a real funding ratio of 100%.   14
Table 8. ALM results for pension-plan variants 
    
    Traditional Current hybrid Collective 
    DB DB-DC  plan  DC 
        
    diagram 2  diagram 1  diagram 3 
Indicators    
    
Real Funding ratio*    
Mean  2025  106% 106% 105% 
Median  2025  106% 122% 110% 
Standard deviation  2025  19% 16% 22% 
mismatch risk  av 20yr  9% 8% 8% 
within P(A<Ln)  2025  11% 2% 5% 
     
Contribution rate     
Mean  av 20yr  18% 18% 17% 
Jump per year  av 20yr  3.3% 2.6% 0% 
     
Indexation ratio     
Mean  av 20yr  100% 93% 91% 
Median  av 20yr  100% 83% 79% 
     
P(IR <100%)  av 20yr  0% 53% 56% 
P(IR cum < 90%)  2025  0% 16% 23% 
P(IR cum < 80%)  2025  0% 9% 15% 
    
*) initial real funding ratio = 85% 
 
Explanation Indicators table 8 
The median, mean, and standard deviation of the real funding ratio are reported at
the end of the 20-year evaluation period. Mismatch risk, defined as the degree of
mismatch between the payoff structures of asset mix and liabilities, is measured by
the standard deviation of the growth rate of the funding ratio. within P(A<Ln) is the
within probability of nominal under-funding; this is the probability of reaching a
position of nominal under-funding within the 20-year evaluation period. The third 
group of indicators relates to indexation quality. The median, mean, and standard 
deviation of the indexation ratio during the period of 20 years are shown. The
yearly indexation ratio is measured as actual indexation over wage growth. The
term P(IR<100) indicates the frequency of less than full indexation. We also
provide an indicator of the indexation quality cumulative over the entire 20-year 
period, the probability that the cumulative value of the indexation ratio at the end of
the 20-year period is less than 90% (less than 80%, respectively) of cumulative end
value of full indexation. 
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The expected real funding ratio after 20 years in all three variants is improved strongly from the 
low level of 85% in 2006, as shown by the mean and the median at the end of the evaluation 
horizon, which reach values above 100%. The mismatch risk for a 50-50 mix for the three 
variants is slightly higher than 8%. The variants differ in how this mismatch risk is absorbed. The 
traditional DB variant absorbs mismatch risk by adjusting the contribution rate in order to restore 
a situation of under-funding or over funding. This results in a high volatility of the contribution 
rate. The average year-to-year change in the contribution rate is 3.3%-percentage points. The 
funding ratio risk and probability of under-funding are reduced strongly, due to the flexible 
contribution rate. 
 
The hybrid plan makes use of two steering instruments to control solvency risk: adjustments in 
contributions and indexation. As a result, the within probability of under-funding almost 
vanishes. The collective DC variant has fixed contribution but flexible indexation. The within 
probability of under-funding slightly increases vis-à-vis the hybrid plan, reflecting the fact that 
the contributions are no longer part of the risk-bearing process. This also explains that the results 
on the indexation ratio are less good compared with the hybrid plan, as the indexation instrument 
has to take up more risk.  
 
Changes in the policy setup of a pension fund may easily lead to redistribution of value and risk 
among the members. Hoevenaars & Ponds (2006) also make use of a tool (so-called value-based 
generational accounting) to calculate value transfers among plan members due to policy changes. 
Figure 1 shows redistribution among plan members due to a switch from the traditional DB plan 
to a hybrid DB-DC plan, respectively, from the traditional DB plan to a collective DC plan. The 
horizontal axis denotes the age of the cohorts in the plan in 2006. We look 20 years forward, so 
also members of cohort –2 will be part of the labor force in 2025. The cohort with an age of 105 
will die with certainty within one year. The vertical axis reports the change in generational 
accounts of each of the age cohorts (generations).  
 
A key characteristic of a pension fund is that it can be seen as a zero-sum game. The total value 
to be distributed within the pension fund at a specific point in time is given, and is equal to the 
value of assets under management. The content of the pension deal is decisive with regard to how 
the total value is distributed among members.  
 
Figure 1 shows that the step from the traditional DB plan to either the hybrid DB-DC plan or the 
collective DC plan leads to redistribution from old to young. The elderly members lose value, as 
they have to accept that de facto unconditional indexation policy is replaced by flexible benefits, 
depending on the financial soundness of the fund. The younger members win, since part of the 




3.4  Evaluation  
  
Pension-plan design is decisive with regard to how risk taken by the pension fund is allocated 
among stakeholders. Table 9 summarizes for key risk measures the performance of the three 
variants under study here. The key risk measures are as follows: the average annual change of the 
contribution rate (column 1), the cumulative deviation from full indexation (column 2) and the 
probability of nominal under-funding (column 3). The asset mix is the same for the three variants, 
so total risk to be distributed is the same for the three variants. The variants differ in the way in 
which risk is allocated over the stakeholders. 
 
Table 9. Summary results of ALM analysis*  
 Average  annual 
change of the 
contribution rate over 
2006-2025 
Probability cumulative 
indexation is less than 80% of 
cumulative full indexation at 
the end of 2025 
Probability of nominal 
under-funding at the end of 
2025 
Traditional DB  3.2  0  11 
Collective DC  0  15  5 
Current hybrid plan  2.6  9  2 
*) See table 8 for explanations. Bold figures indicate the highest risk. 
 
The table shows the various trade-offs confronted in pension-plan design. Full indexation in the 
traditional DB plan comes at the cost of both a higher risk of nominal under-funding and a high 
 
Fig 1: Value redistribution between generations over 2005-2026 when switching 
from traditional DB plan to hybrid DB-DC plan or to collective DC plan 
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volatility of contribution rates. Fixed contribution rates in collective DC plans come mainly at the 
cost of high indexation risk. The current hybrid plan takes a midway position in these trade-offs: 
there is still volatility in contribution rates and there is less-than-full indexation, which leads to a 
considerable redistribution of value from older members to younger members. What is gained in 
the current plans is a lower probability of nominal under-funding in comparison to both 
traditional DB plans and collective DC plans. The pension funds introduced flexible indexations 
as the primary method to enhance solvency risk management.  
 
4.  Explaining the switch in Dutch pension funds 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The current hybrid DB/DC pension-plan structure uses adjustments in both contributions and 
indexation as steering instruments to control solvency risk. Section 4.2 attempts to explain why 
pensions plans rely on both instruments and not on one of the instruments exclusively. This 
seems to be a reflection of a compromise between the various stakeholders. Section 4.3, which 
looks at the institutional basis for this compromise, contrasts the Dutch experience with that of 
the UK and US, where employers were the dominant agents in the switch from DB to individual 
DC plans. We discuss why employers in the Netherlands were less able to control the evolution 
of pension funds and why they had to compromise. In this perspective, the governance structure 
and the need to compromise in the Dutch situation are central in explaining the evolution of 
pension funds.     
 
4.2  Average-wage plans as a compromise solution  
 
Traditionally, risk management by Dutch pension funds in the postwar period was done primarily 
by adjustments in the contribution rate. A high funding ratio gives rise to contribution cuts, 
whereas a funding ratio that is perceived as too low leads to an increase in the contribution rate. 
Given the tight deadlines set by the pension supervisor to restore solvency, and the requirement 
for cost-covering contribution rates, it is hardly surprising that the traditional instrument of 
raising contribution rates was no longer useful to restore solvency. Below we explain why risk 
management solely through the contribution rate was no longer appropriate. We then explain the 
switch from final-pay plans to average-wage plans from the need to extend solvency-contingent 
indexation from pension benefits to all accrued rights.  
 
Constraints on higher contribution rates 
After the millennium turn, awareness grew that risk management through contribution rates 
exclusively was no longer appropriate. First, since most Dutch pension funds stem from the 50s 
and 60s, they have now, after 40 years, a high degree of maturity — as a large group of members 
has reached the retirement age. Typical for a mature pension fund is that the ratio of pensioners 
over workers is high, and also that the ratio of the value of pension-fund liabilities over wages is 
high. The ratio between liabilities and total wages is expected to rise from approximately 2.5 now   18
to 4.5 in 2030. This sharp increase will severely undermine the effectiveness of the contribution 
rate as a steering instrument. To improve the funding ratio by 1% would require an additional 
contribution of 4.5% in the future, instead of the 2.5% in the present. 
 
For employers, it was important to address this declining effectiveness of the contribution rate as 
a steering mechanism, and to spread risks more evenly over participants and sponsors. But this 
also was a concern for unions. Unions in the Netherlands have to strike an internal compromise 
between the interests of younger workers, on the one hand, and the interests of older workers and 
pensioners (who often retain their trade union membership), on the other. In most cases, 
moreover, union representatives in pension boards are often closely involved in wage 
negotiations. This explains why unions have been willing to spread risks more broadly between 
active members and pensioners. An exclusive reliance on contribution rates to absorb risks would 
run the risk of alienation of younger workers and put a heavy burden on wage negotiations, as 
employers would try to shift pension costs to workers.        
 
Constraints on lowering indexation of benefits 
In most final-wage pension plans, indexation of pension benefits was, at least on paper, 
dependent on the solvency position of the pension fund.  Thus, in principle, pension funds could 
have invoked this possibility and shifted investment risk to pensioners. Given the maturity of 
most funds, this would have presented an effective instrument for restoring solvency. This would 
have been difficult, however, as the conditional indexation of pension benefits had been poorly 
communicated to participants. Moreover, the clauses had been seldom invoked, as the financial 
situation of most funds was healthy or it was considered to be so in view of the old actuarial 
framework for valuing pension liabilities. As a consequence, strong resistance from pensioners 
might have been expected. Pensioners might have felt that they were the victim of contribution 
holidays in the roaring 1990s, when they threatened to go to court in case pension funds decided 
to shift risk their way only. As many pensioners remain union members after retiring, unions 
could not neglect their concerns. A way out was to broaden solvency-contingent indexation to all 
liabilities — including accrued rights of active members. Technically, this implied a switch from 
final-wage plans to solvency-contingent average-wage plans.       
 
4.3  Adherence to collective risk-sharing: Explaining differences with the UK and the US 
 
Pension funds in the Netherlands are independent financial institutions governed by a board 
where both employers and unions are represented. The influence of employers in the Anglo-
Saxon pension funds is much bigger, in contrast; they are — as sponsors of pensions funds — 
responsible for correcting situations of under-funding. This difference in the government and 
regulation of pension funds goes a long way toward explaining why in the US and the UK there 
has been a stronger shift to individual DC schemes (where employers have shifted risks to their 
employees), while in the Netherlands risk-sharing is both collective and spread more evenly 
among various stakeholders. These differences regarding the position of employers are related to 
the dominance of mandatory industry-wide pension funds in the Netherlands. Additionally, the   19
role of unions as agents of social solidarity has remained important in the Netherlands. This is an 
important difference with the US, where the demise of DB plans seems to be related to the 
decline of unionism. Finally, in contrast to the UK and the US, the unions’ concern for social 
solidarity is broadly supported in Dutch society, and none of the political parties has come out in 
favor of strengthening personal pension provision at the cost of second- (or first-) pillar pensions.   
These points — the shared governance of pension funds, the position of unions, and the societal 
support for social solidarity and collective risk-sharing — are discussed in greater detail below.  
 
The position of employers  
In Anglo-Saxon pension funds, employers contribute to the pension plans, direct the investments 
and bear the risks. Employers were fully responsible for correcting situations of under-funding in 
defined benefit plans (Laboul and Yermo 2006: 506). Thus, compared to continental European 
countries, Anglo-Saxon countries have generally allowed a much greater involvement of 
employers in the administration of pension funds, and employers have been given greater 
flexibility to correct under-funding (idem). New accounting rules have forced employers to reveal 
their risks in defined-benefit systems more clearly. As a result, shareholders are pushing for 
closer matching of risks and liabilities and for shifting investments and longevity risks to 
employees. Just after these new accounting rules were implemented, funding ratios of US and 
British pension plans fell sharply — to levels of 80 percent (thus much deeper than funding ratios 
of Dutch company funds) — which caused the pressure on defined benefits to come to a head 
(Munnell 2006: 375). This explains why the perfect storm accelerated the longer-term shift in the 
Anglo-Saxon world from DB plans to individual DC plans.     
 
Similar to their counterparts in other continental European countries, pension funds in the 
Netherlands are independent financial institutions with their own governance and administrative 
structure separate from that of the employers (Laboul and Yermo 2006: 506). Dutch pension 
funds therefore argue that risk-sharing is spread more broadly in Dutch pension funds, that the 
funds and not employers are responsible for correcting situations of under-funding, and that the 
new accounting rules should consequently be applied differently for Dutch pension funds. The 
legal status as a separate trust gives pension funds a significant degree of operational autonomy 
that is not always present in the Anglo-Saxon trust model (ibid). Employers and unions are 
equally represented on Dutch pension fund boards. Thus, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon defined-
benefit plans, employers in continental Europe are less able to dominate and to direct pension 
fund management and policy, and therefore must compromise more with unions. The other side 
of the coin, however, is that they also are not regarded as exclusively responsible for correcting 
situations related to under-funding and risk-bearing. This contrast is accentuated by the 
dominance in the Netherlands of industry pension funds, which are absent in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. Individual DC elements in pension plans are virtually absent within industry pension 
funds, and risk-sharing is still predominantly done collectively through policy ladders (see 
section 2.4).   
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The importance of unions as agents of social solidarity 
Especially in the United States, the shift from DB plans to individual DC plans has been related 
to the decline of unionism. Ghilarducci (2006: 385) notes that unions operate on the principle of 
solidarity — a context of shared interests, responsibilities, and fellowship that helps to explain 
why they prefer DB plans to individualistic DC plans
2. The decline in unionism, defined-benefit 
plans and pension funding is related to the employment shift from large hierarchic manufacturing 
firms and industries to the more diverse service sector (Munnell 2006: 367).  
 
In terms of membership, Dutch unions are not particularly strong. They organize around 25 
percent of employees. Also in the Netherlands union membership has declined. However, the 
institutional set-up of labor relations gives unions a much stronger position than their true power 
permits (see Crouch 1993: 289). As an example, the coverage rate of collective bargaining is very 
high (over 80 percent). This has to do with both the high organization rate of employers and the 
mandatory extension of collective contracts (see European Commission 2004: 30-31).  
 
Also the institutional set-up of the pension system gives unions a stronger position than is merited 
by the unions’ membership ratio. The mandatory extension of collective contracts is historically 
intertwined with the mandatory extension of industry pension funds, which predominantly 
explains the high pension coverage rate in the Netherlands. The representation of unions in 
pension boards gives them a strong institutional position.  
 
Societal and political support for collective risk-sharing 
The shift to individualistic DC plans in the US and the UK has a strong ideological and political 
dimension. In the 1980s, the conservative government of Ms. Thatcher aggressively promoted the 
opt-out of collective pension schemes to individual pensions (Munnell 2006: 371). In the US, 
personal pension provision is high on the political agenda of the Republican Bush administration. 
Moreover, as Wiles (2006) shows, Republican ideology is pushing DC plans through state 
legislatures, while the Democrats and their union supporters are attempting to block these plans 
for public workers.  
 
In the Netherlands, in contrast, a shift to individual pension provision is not on the political 
agenda. Surveys show that most people prefer collective risk-sharing over individual DC plans 
with greater investor autonomy, and that there is a high degree of household confidence in the 
current pension scheme (Van Rooij, Kool and Prast 2005). We show in section 5.3 and in the 
appendix that this preference for collective risk-sharing is supported by economic analysis.  
 
The willingness to share risk collectively and to accept its possible distributional consequences 
presupposes a certain degree of societal trust. Indeed, the European and World Value studies 
show a relatively high degree of social trust in the Netherlands (Dekker and van den Broek 2005: 
                                                 
2  For a more elaborate discussion of the importance of social solidarity for collective pension provision, see: De Deken, Ponds & 
Van Riel (2006).   21
49). Such a high level of trust is also found in the Scandinavian countries. These surveys also 
indicate that social trust seems to be relatively low in the US and the UK.    
 
 
5.  From hybrid DB/DC pensions to collective DC plans 
 
5.1  A further evolution towards collective DC 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2, a number of pension funds have already gone one step further than 
the hybrid plan by abolishing the use of the contribution rate as a risk-steering instrument. We 
characterize this type of plan as a collective DC, and expect more pensions funds to follow. The 
main reason for this is that the volatility in contribution rates remains relatively high in hybrid 
pension plans (see table 9). This will be magnified by the effect of ageing, which will severely 
undermine the effectiveness of the contribution rate as a steering instrument (see section 4.2).  
 
However, as shown in figure 1, a further step towards a collective DC will lead to even more 
redistribution from old to young. This might be both undesirable (in view of the risk-bearing 
capacity of the old) and unacceptable for the old. We therefore expect this shift to a collective DC 
to be accompanied by a rethinking of the intergenerational contract, leading to more 
differentiation in risk exposure between younger and older members (compare Boeri 2006: 68 ff).  
 
5.2  Rethinking the intergenerational contract 
 
Pension funds in the Netherlands typically administer a uniform pension plan for heterogeneous 
groups of plan members. The funding process has a collective base: one asset mix, a uniform 
contribution rate and risk-sharing. In the coming decades, the degree of maturity of many pension 
funds in the Netherlands will increase. For example, within the largest pension fund ABP, the 
relative share of non-active members (primarily retirees) in the total liabilities will rise from less 
than 40% in 2004 towards 70% within 20 years. This increase will inevitably affect the asset mix. 
The investment policy will necessarily become more conservative in order to ensure that the 
indexation promise can be met to the greatest extent possible. A conservative mix will not be 
attractive for younger workers, as the low return on assets implies higher contributions to fund 
the accrual of their new liabilities. Young workers, moreover, regard a conservative asset mix for 
their retirement savings as far from optimal, from the optimal lifecycle planning perspective (see 
Appendix).  
 
We foresee that pension funds will evolve in their ability to differentiate more in risk exposure 
between younger and older members. This risk differentiation should particularly be oriented 
toward realizing more certainty for the elderly regarding the indexation of their benefits and 
allowing the younger members to have more risk exposure so that they have the prospect of 
higher returns. A challenging question in such a redesign of the pension plan is whether or not it   22
is possible to combine risk differentiation regarding ages with a safeguarding of the benefits of 
collective funding and intergenerational risk-sharing.  
 
At least two basic choices in the design of an age-dependent policy can be discerned. Both 
options enable risk differentiation to ages, and both are in line with the recommended risk 
strategy of the theory of optimal individual lifecycle planning.  
 
Age-dependent indexation policy 
One way to achieve an age-dependent risk policy is to adjust the indexation rule to ages. The 
current indexation rule for a typical pension plan is that accrued benefits are indexed yearly for 
the growth of wages in the industry. A policy ladder may be operative, so that the actual 
indexation rate depends on the financial position of the pension fund.  This indexation rule can be 
adjusted easily to arrive at an age-dependent indexation policy. The indexation consists of two 
parts. The first is related to wage growth, as in the current setup. The second part is related to the 
excess return over the discount rate of real liabilities. For a wage-indexed defined-benefit plan, 
this discount rate has to be equal to the difference between the (expected) nominal rate of interest 
and the (expected) wage growth. 
 
For x ≤ 64 years: 




















For x > 64 years:  
 
Indexation = wage growth 
 
where 
x  = age of participant 
RA   = return on (selected) asset mix 
d%   = discount rate indexed liabilities 
 
With the introduction of such an indexation rule, it may also be possible to split up the asset mix 
in two parts: a conservative asset mix (underlying the part of the liabilities where the indexation 
is related to wage growth) and a more risky asset mix (underlying the liabilities of which the 
indexation is related to the excess return). An open question is what the impact may be of a 
situation of under-funding or over-funding on the overall indexation. A policy ladder may still be 
operative in correcting the actual indexation for the funding position. 
A main advantage of this indexation rule is that an age-dependent policy of risk differentiation 
can be implemented, with safeguards for the institutional structure of pension-fund plans in 
operation, as plan members continue to build up new liabilities for each year of service. The only 
thing that has been changed is the nature of the indexation policy for the workers.  
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“First DC, then DB” 
A more radical idea is to allow workers to keep their contributions in an individual DC plan. 
Upon retirement, the end value of the DC account is converted in indexed DB liabilities. The 
asset management for the DC accounts is carried out by professionals who aim to establish an 
investment strategy in line with the recommendations of individual lifecycle planning. The 
management of the assets relating to the DB liabilities is also a responsibility of professionals. 
These assets are held in an asset mix that is a good approximation of the perfect match for DB 
liabilities. A perfect match can be realized when workers sell wage-indexed bonds to the elderly 
that are equal to the value of the liabilities of the elderly. In turn, the workers get to manage the 
assets of the elderly. These assets are held in a risky portfolio. The net return of the leveraged 
position is equal to difference between the return on assets in the risky portfolio minus the costs 
of indexation, which is related to the growth rate of wages. This net return must be distributed 
among the workers according to some agreed-upon rule. This return supplements the increase in 
accrued liabilities due to the regular wage growth. This contract gives the elderly the prospect of 
indexation certainty, whereas the young may expect a higher growth rate of their liabilities. 
 
5.3 Collective DC versus individual DC 
 
As appropriate benefit adjustmetns take up a large part of pension-fund risk in the new collective 
schemes, one may wonder what the advantages are of keeping the collective scheme compared 
with an individual DC scheme. We use the ALM analysis presented in section 3 to compare the 
collective and individual approaches.   
 
Since we strive for a level playing field in the comparison, we compare the individual DC plan 
with a collective DC plan, as both schemes have a fixed contribution rate. It is assumed that both 
plans have the same ambition level of a pension income of 80% of average wage for a working 
period of 40 years. The funding process is also comparable. Both plans have a fixed contribution 
rate of 18%. The asset mix in both plans consists of 50% bonds and 50% stocks. The collective 
DC plan has an initial real funding ratio of 100%
3.  
 
We evaluate for a 20-year horizon. The output of the collective plan is the same as that reported 
in the preceding section. At the end of the 20 years, the mean and median of the funding ratio of 
the collective DC plan are around 130% due to an average excess return of more than 2%. The 
counterpart of the funding ratio of the DB plan for a DC plan is the ratio of accumulated wealth 
over the required wealth to realize the target of 80% average wage income. We report for this 
ratio the mean, median, and the probability of under-funding.  
 
Table 10 reports for the collective plan some key results of the indexation ratio. For the 
individual DC plan we used a constructed indexation ratio. We translated the accumulated wealth 
at the end of the 20-year period in terms of the actual indexation reserve vis-à-vis the required 
                                                 
3   Note that this differs from the simulations in section 6 where we start with a real funding ratio of 85%, i.e. a situation of 
under-funding.    24
indexation reserve to realize the target of 80% average wage income. The table shows that in both 
plans the mean and median of the indexation ratio come close to the aimed level of 100%, 
although the DC plan leads to considerably higher volatility in the indexation ratio compared to 
the hybrid plan. The individual DC plan has both a high upside risk and a high downside risk, as 
can be seen from the reported results on probability of cumulative indexation ratio. 
 
Table 10. ALM results for collective DC plan and individual DC plan 2006-2025 
 
 Collective DC  Individual DC   
 Indicators  Indicators   
      
 Real funding ratio*  Actual assets vs. required assets 
2025  Mean  132%  Mean  101% 
2025  Median  128%  Median  98% 
2025  within P(A<Ln)  0.3%  within P(A<Ln)  nr 
         
  Contribution rate    Contribution rate   
av 20 yr  Fixed  17%  Fixed  17% 
         
  Indexation ratio    Constructed Indexation ratio 
2025  Mean  96%  Mean  102% 
2025  Median  100%  Median  95% 
         
2025  P(IR cum >120%)  nr  P(IR cum >120%)  33% 
2025  P(IR cum >110%)  nr  P(IR cum >110%)  40% 
2025  P(IR cum <100%)  14%  P(IR cum <100%)  54% 
2025  P(IR cum < 90%  5%  P(IR cum < 90%)  46% 
2025  P(IR cum < 80%  2%  P(IR cum < 80%)  37% 
  *) initial real funding ratio 
=100% 
     
Compare table 8 for explanation 
 
The risk exposure in DC plans in real life will be even larger than the results reported in table 10. 
First of all, we distinguish only one type of financial market risk: the uncertainty regarding the 
real return on DC savings (i.e. the gross return on investments minus wage growth). Workers 
who want to convert the DC wealth into annuities at the end of their working period have to face 
additional risks. This concerns both the uncertainty regarding the prevailing market rate of 
interest at the moment of conversion, and the fact that workers who have bought nominal 
annuities are exposed to inflation risk   
 
We calculated what the costs would have been to buy a nominal annuity of 1 euro for the period 
of 1956-2006, given the nominal rate of interest prevailing in those years for a 65-year-old man. 
We applied the same mortality table over the entire period 1949 to 2005.  Figure 2 reports the 
results. The costs of the one-euro nominal annuities varied considerably over this period. In 
general, the higher the rate of interest, the lower the costs are for a one-euro nominal annuity, as 
the insurance company can invest in higher yielding bonds.    25
 






















DC plans in real life are far from cost-effective. Table 11 below presents the results of a study of 
the central bank in the Netherlands on the operational costs of pension funds and life insurance 
companies. Costs related to investments are omitted. The differences in costs are enormous.  The 
costs as a percentage of assets under management for the insurance companies are around eight 
times higher than for pension funds. Moreover, life insurance companies mark up the costs with a 
profit margin. For a typical policyholder, 2.35% of the investment return is directed to the 
insurance company. Pension funds need only 0.15% to back their operational costs. The 
remaining part of the investment returns is available for the plan members.  
 





Life insurance companies 
 
  Operational costs  Operational costs  Profit margin  Total 
        
% of contributions  4.4  12.9  11.0  23.9 
        
% of total assets  0.15  1.27  1.08  2.35 
Source: Bikker and De Dreu (2006) 
 
The impact of costs on the final pension result is huge. Let us assume that the additional costs of 
individual plans vis-à-vis collective plans are of the magnitude of 0.5% and 1%, respectively. 
When the policyholder at the insurance company pays the same contribution rate (equal to 18%) 
as the plan member in the pension fund, then he will end up with 11% (21%) less pension income 
compared with the pension-fund participant. The policyholder may react to the high cost structure   26
by paying more contributions. The required increase in the contribution rate would be 2.5% (5%) 
yearly. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Mainly in reaction to the fall in funding ratios at the beginning of this century, Dutch pension 
funds switched from final-salary schemes to average-wage schemes, which are both classified by 
official statistics as DB schemes. This contrasts with the situation in the UK and the US, where 
the fall in pension funding ratios as a consequence of the stock market crash accelerated the 
switch from DB pension plans to DC pension plans. However, we have shown in this study that 
the typical current Dutch pension plan has to be regarded as a hybrid DB-DC plan. Since these 
hybrid plans make use of two steering mechanisms to control solvency risk, they are quite 
effective in minimizing the risk of under-funding.  
 
The current hybrid pension plan reflects a compromise between the different stakeholders in 
Dutch pension funds. Pension funds in the Netherlands are independent financial institutions 
governed by a board on which both employers and unions are represented. In contrast, the 
influence of employers in the Anglo-Saxon pension funds is much greater, and they are — as 
sponsors of pension funds— responsible for correcting situations of under-funding. This 
difference in the government and regulation of pensions funds goes a long way in explaining why 
in the US and the UK there has been a stronger shift to individual DC schemes (where employers 
have shifted risks to individual employees), while in the Netherlands risk-sharing is both 
collective and spread more evenly among various stakeholders. These differences with respect to 
the position of employers are related to the dominance of mandatory sector-wide pension funds in 
the Netherlands. Additionally, the role of unions as agents of social solidarity has remained 
important in the Netherlands. Finally, we pointed out that there is much societal and political 
support for collective risk-sharing in the Netherlands, which reflects a high level of social trust.  
 
We expect that the role of the employer in bearing risk will be reduced, and that the current 
hybrid schemes will evolve toward stand-alone multimember collective DC pension plans. This 
will be accompanied by more differentiation in risk exposure between younger and older 
members. Risk differentiation will help elderly members to obtain more certainty regarding the 
indexation of their benefits and younger members to have more risk exposure so that they have 
the prospect of higher returns.  
 
Collective risk-sharing will thus remain an important element in Dutch pension funds. This 
contrasts with developments in the Anglo-Saxon world, where more risks are shifted toward the 
individual. In this sense, the evolution of Dutch pension schemes diverges from the developments 
of Anglo-Saxon pension funds. Finally, we argued that collective risk-sharing has some 
important advantages over individual risk-sharing.    27
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APPENDIX  
 




The pension crisis has involved a lively debate — particularly among academic economists — on 
the merits and disadvantages of intergenerational risk-sharing within funded multi-member plans. 
Is it still worthwhile to structure pension-plan provision on the basis of intergenerational risk-
sharing? The broadly shared conclusion from this debate is that although intergenerational risk-
sharing may indeed lead to welfare improvement for the members, the plan design is of crucial 
importance (Teulings & de Vries 2006; Cui et al. 2006; Boender et al. 2006). This section gives 
an overview of the shared insights as a result of this discussion. 
 
A.2 Optimal lifecycle financial planning 
 
The literature on optimal lifecycle planning points out that the optimal investments in risky assets 














f(x)  = fraction of financial capital in stocks at age x 
μ  = expected rate of return stocks 
r  = risk-free rate 
θ  = risk aversion 
σ
2  = riskiness of stocks (variance) 
HCx  = human capital at age x 
FCx  = financial capital at age x 
 
 
The first part in the right-hand side of expression (1) is the standard result from the literature on 
dynamic asset allocation over time. Under some conditions, which are quite restrictive of nature 
but broadly accepted in theoretical analysis, this term says that the individual should maintain a 
constant part of financial wealth in risky assets over his lifecycle, regardless of the size of wealth 
and age. The share in risky assets is increasing in the risk premium μ− r, defined as the difference 
between the expected return on risky assets μ and the risk-free rate r, and decreasing in the 
degree of riskiness of the risky assets σ
2 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion θ. The 
standard result of the first term is derived under the following conditions:   30
[1] The risk attitude of the individual is characterized by constant relative risk aversion, which 
means that the individual maintains the same percentage exposure to risky assets regardless of the 
changes in wealth. 
[2] Investment returns follow a random walk (returns are independent and identically 
distributed); there is no mean reversion. 
[3] Since the individual has no other income than investment income, personal wealth is financial 
wealth. 
Personal wealth of an individual consists not only of financial capital but also of human capital. 
Bodie et al. (1992) show that the asset allocation rule has to be augmented with the second part in 
expression (1). The term HC reflects the present value of remaining human capital, which 
approximately equals the stream of wages to be received over the rest of the working period. The 
term FC is the value of financial assets at the moment of evaluation. The sum of HC and FC is 
available for consumption over the remaining lifetime. As figure A.1 displays, personal wealth is 
at a maximum when an individual enters the labor market. Personal wealth gradually declines 
over the lifetime, as wealth is transmitted in yearly consumption. Since at retirement age (say 65) 
all human capital is depleted, consumption during retirement must come from financial capital.  
 













Expression (1) actually states that young individuals should invest a large part of their personal 
wealth in risky assets, and that they should subsequently diminish gradually the relative share of 
risky assets in personal wealth as they grow older. This strategy improves the return-risk tradeoff 
over the lifecycle as it employs risk diversification possibilities between human capital and 
financial capital. Essentially, it is based on the exploitation of the correlation between the return 
on human capital (wage growth) and financial capital (stock market return). The optimal rule 
suggests that workers in their youth should borrow in bonds and use the proceeds to invest in 
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In real life, individuals find it difficult to realize optimal asset allocation over time. Three main 
reasons can be mentioned: 
 
[1] Borrowing constraints 
Expression (1) implies that young individuals should exchange their human capital in financial 
capital in order to eliminate exclusive exposure to human capital risk and to replace it by a 
diversified portfolio consisting of human and financial capital. A high share of their wealth in 
risky assets can be realized when young individuals have to borrow and invest the borrowed sum 
in risky assets. Young individuals, however, face borrowing constraints. Although they have a 
large value of human capital, they cannot borrow with their future wage income as collateral,  
due to adverse selection and moral hazard. Young individuals thus cannot realize the optimal 
relative share in risky assets.   
 
[2] Missing market for trade between current and future generations 
Over their working period, workers build up financial capital from savings out of their wage 
income. The literature on intergenerational risk-sharing (Shiller 1999; Gordon & Varian 1988; 
Gollier 2006) clarifies that the tradeoff between return and risk offered by the financial market 
could be improved considerably if the current generations would be able to trade with future 
generations (not yet born or in school). Macroeconomic shocks could then be distributed over 
time and among more individuals, which diminishes individual exposure to shocks. Capital 
markets cannot offer financial assets that enable intergenerational risk-sharing, as the current 
generation cannot commit the future generation to the intergenerational contract.  
 
The argument applies particularly to those shocks that hit all members of a generation in the same 
way, like inflation shocks and productivity growth shocks. One natural way to organize 
intergenerational risk-sharing is to allow young and future generations to sell index-bond linked 
to inflation or productivity growth to the elderly. The young and future generations pay the 
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elderly when inflation and productivity growth is lower than expected. A second way to organize 
intergenerational risk-sharing is that young generations provide guarantees to the elderly 
regarding the minimum return on their retirement savings. Effectively, this comes down to the 
situation that the young generation writes a put option. This idea is discussed by Smetters (2003) 
and Constantinides et al. (2005) in relation to the debate in the US to reform the social security 
pay-as-you-go scheme into a privatized funded DC scheme. A third way to organize 
intergenerational risk-sharing is to facilitate the sharing of risks between young and old members 
in collective funded pension plans within the institutional setting of a pension fund. This is 
discussed below in section A.3. 
 
[3] Sub-optimal individual decision-making 
Optimal decision-making over the lifecycle requires that individuals constantly reconsider their 
asset allocation and planned consumption path in relation to changes in their realized wealth 
position and their expectations for the future development of personal wealth. The now 
widespread insights of behavioral finance clarify that most (if not all) individuals fail to realize 
the optimal policy due to a lack of expertise, myopic behavior, hyperbolic discounting and so on. 
In real life, furthermore, individuals face high transaction costs in trading on financial markets or 
in making use of financial intermediation. 
 
 
A.3 Collective plans with intergenerational risk-sharing 
 
Funded multi-member plans with intergenerational risk-sharing and mandatory participation have 
the potential to overcome the problems sketched above with regard to realizing optimal lifecycle 
asset allocation. As a point of reference we evaluate an average-wage plan, where indexation is 
conditional on the financial position of the pension fund ruled by a policy ladder. The 
contribution rate may be either flexible or fixed. 
 
A shock in the stock market affects the financial wealth position of individuals. According to 
optimal lifecycle planning, individuals must react by adjusting their consumption path for the 
remaining part of their lifetime according to the change in the financial wealth position. The 
stock market shock also impacts pension-fund wealth. The rules of the policy ladder prescribe 
whether and to what extent the change in pension fund wealth is transmitted to adjustments in the 
indexation and contribution rates. The weaker the relationship, the more risk is borne by future 
generations. The broad risk-bearing capacity of the plan explains why the impact of a shock on 
the individual consumption path is smaller compared to the consumption adjustment in the 
optimal individual plan, as losses and gains can be distributed among current and future plan 
members. The young and future members increase their risk exposure, moreover, as they take 
over a part of the funding risks related to the accrued rights of the elderly. Furthermore, 
professional decision-making and asset management on behalf of the members prevents 
individual failures in lifecycle financial planning. Finally, a collective plan appears to be highly 
cost-effective. 
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